OPINION: N. Korean provocations possible, but should not be over-interpreted

North Korea watchers and so-called experts, like myself, are rushing to explain what the sudden, if not unexpected, death of Kim Jong Il means for North Korea. After all, the DPRK is a nuclear-armed country -- the dangers from instability in North Korea extend far beyond the Korean Peninsula. Yet none of us really know what will happen.

Initial reports seem to indicate an orderly succession. The current thinking I hear most often is Kim Jong Un will rely on his father's brother-in-law, Chang Sung Taek, as a sort of regent, while the younger Kim consolidates power. Yet, we know very little about the actual inner workings of North Korean politics or the constellation of power in Pyongyang. And no one can predict the future. Unexpected things may happen -- ill health, for example, may strike Chang, or even the younger Kim himself. Or perhaps some of North Korea's ruling elite will attempt to push Kim aside.

Leadership transitions produce winners and losers -- but not overnight. This is deadly serious business that will take some time to sort out. After China's Mao Zedong died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping did not fully displace Mao's designated successor, Hua Guofeng, for several years. Kim Jong Il took three years to formally acquire his full set of titles, although we know little about how much power Kim had then -- or after.

Politics in North Korea will determine North Korea's approach to nuclear issues, not the other way around. Consider North Korea's proliferation behavior. An important dynamic over the past few decades has been how Jon Byong Ho and his son-in-law, Yun Ho Jin -- described by a friend of mine as the ''dynamic duo of North Korean proliferation'' -- have used the hard currency earnings and diplomatic leverage created by selling missiles and nuclear technology to countries like Pakistan, Iran, and Burma to maintain their political position in Pyongyang. Will their respective fortunes wax or wane? Will they bet on the right horse or the wrong one?

In the interim, North Korea seems unlikely to be able to make significant compromises on any foreign policy issue, let alone the nuclear issue. U.S. and Japanese officials have remarked that Kim Jong Il's direct intervention was often necessary in reaching agreements with North Korea. In recent years, as Kim Jong Il's health declined, some observers described a near paralysis in North Korea's decision-making apparatus. It seems likely that the six-party talks will stall while the leadership transition takes place in Pyongyang, and Seoul and Washington hold elections.

There remains the possibility, of course, of military provocations. Perhaps North Korea's new rulers will seek to demonstrate their strength and commitment to national defense with another nuclear test.

Yet, we should be cautious in over-interpreting North Korea's provocations. Early reports that North Korea test-fired a short-range ballistic missile were linked to Kim's death. Further reporting, however, revealed the test preparations had been observed for some time. North Korea was going to test that missile anyway. It is easy to ascribe North Korea's provocations to the leadership situation, but in fact we seldom know why North Korea does one thing or another.

None of us know what our future holds, least of all those who compete for power and influence in an arbitrary, authoritarian system like North Korea. Perhaps, right now, Jon Byong Ho himself is sitting by himself, asking the same question as the rest of us: ''What now?''

(Jeffrey Lewis is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.)

==Kyodo